



Occasional Papers on Korea



Number Four



Edited by James B. Palais and Margery D. Lang

The Joint Committee on Korean Studies of
the American Council of Learned Societies
and the Social Science Research Council



September 1975

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Yun Ch'i-ho as a Reformer

Family Background and Early Years

Yun Ch'i-ho was born on December 26, 1864, in the village of Sinch'on, in Asan-gun, Ch'ungch'ōng province.¹ His father, Yun Ung-yōl, a member of the Haep'yōng Yun clan, was a military official who had passed the higher military examinations in 1856 and was at his second major duty post in Hamgyōng province when Ch'i-ho was born.² The family owned land in Suwōn and Asan and had a tradition of sporadic officeholding going back to the sixteenth century, and while it had produced no noteworthy officials in the early 1800s, Yun Ung-yōl had set his mind to succeed as a military officer. By 1864 he was on his way to a distinguished public career. If his family was not among the wealthiest in Korea, there was no hardship either, and bright prospects greeted the birth of his first son, Ch'i-ho.

Yun Ch'i-ho's upbringing followed the traditional pattern for children of the yangban aristocracy. His mother, who had had something of a classical education herself, began teaching him to read when he was four. We are told in his biography that from an early age Ch'i-ho wanted to take the civil service examinations and become an official. His goal was to become the governor of Chōlla province. From this we can perhaps infer that Ung-yōl's ambitions for his son were at least as great as for himself.

Ch'i-ho's early schooling took place in the local *sōdang*, and his biography gives a glowing picture of the boy's progress. By the time he was nine years old the family had moved from Asan to their city home in Sūng-dong, Seoul. Ch'i-ho was used to the open spaces of the countryside and found the new quarters confining, but he was able to amuse himself by playing in the small backyard with his sister, Kyōng-hūi. Still, his main business lay with his books, and his father tried to minimize distractions for him by sending him to live and study in the home of a neighbor, Kim Chōng-ōn. There, we are told, Ch'i-ho read all day and wrote all night. He mastered his schoolbooks quickly, and perhaps he grew a bit overconfident as well, for at the age of twelve he made an impertinent attempt to sit for a lower civil service examination and had to be turned away at the gate. He then set to work on more difficult texts and by the next year had read the *San kuo chih* and the *Shui hu*

*Yun Ch'i-ho (1864-1945): Portrait
of a Korean Intellectual in
an Era of Transition*

Donald N. Clark

Introduction

The history of Korea from 1876 to 1910 sometimes suggests that the Koreans did surprisingly little to protect themselves from foreign domination. On closer reading, however, it is clear that there were men of vision who tried their best to awaken the Korean leadership and people to the dangers converging on their country. One of these was Yun Ch'i-ho.

The life of Yun Ch'i-ho (1864-1945) spanned the years between the Kanghwa Treaty and the defeat of Japan in World War II, and he saw at close range nearly every important event that took place in Korea during that time. His life touched the crucial issues of his time and his character and personality were molded by the often-conflicting forces that were buffeting his country. He was one of the first Koreans to travel abroad, to become a Christian, and to learn a foreign language. He served as a government official, as a reformer in the Independence Club, as an underground resistance leader, as a social worker, and, at the end of his life, as a defendant against charges of collaboration with the Japanese. How he saw the issues and tried to deal with them in light of a changing value system has implications for our understanding of modern Korea, for few Korean lives reflect the many trials of the Korean nation as does the life of Yun Ch'i-ho. In many ways the story of his life is the story of his people.



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chuan and had attained a level reached by few of his fellows. In 1879, when he was fourteen, he was married to a neighborhood girl. Except for her surname, Kang, we know virtually nothing about her, and we cannot tell how seriously Yun took his adolescent marriage. We do know that he did not take her with him when he went to Japan, and she is mentioned again in Yun's biography only when the author reports her death in 1886.

In the late seventies and early eighties, Yun Ung-yōl was rising through the military bureaucracy. In 1880 he was assigned to go with Kim Hong-jip to Japan where he helped Lieutenant Horimoto Reizō set up and train the *pyōlgigun*, or "special skill force," then being organized with Japanese advice to become an elite guard for the palace in Seoul.¹ Upon his return to Korea Yun Ung-yōl arranged for his son to go to Japan also, as a student attendant to the *sinsa yuramdan*, the "gentlemen's observation group," dispatched by King Kojong to assess and report on Japanese modernization. Yun Ch'i-ho's specific task on the journey was to act as a personal servant to one of the principal observers in the group, Ō Yun-jung. Thus in May 1881, at the age of sixteen, Yun Ch'i-ho left Korea to begin exploring a world that until 1876 had been kept warily away by a recalcitrant Korean regime.

When the Korean observers completed their mission and returned to Korea they left behind a number of their student attendants. Fukuzawa Yukichi,² having had frequent contact with the group, took several of the young men into Keiō Gijuku. The Japanese foreign minister, Inoue Kaoru, arranged for Yun Ch'i-ho to enter Nakamura Masanao's Dōjin-sha,³ where he began to study Japanese. Later on, at the urging of Kim Ok-kyun,⁴ Yun also began English lessons privately, exchanging an hour's Korean for an hour's English with a secretary at the Dutch consulate in Yokohama.

Meanwhile Ch'i-ho's father ran into trouble back home. On July 23, 1882, elements of the regular Korean army attacked the palace in Seoul to protest official inattention to soldiers' food and wages and to object to the special status of the *pyōlgigun*, of which Yun Ung-yōl was then recruiting officer.⁵ The revolt led to the ouster of numerous members of the Korean reform group and a basic change in the attitude of the Korean government toward China and Japan. The Japanese legation was burned and Minister Hanahusa Yoshitada was forced to flee the country.

Yun Ung-yōl was among those ousted, and he felt obliged to flee to Japan where he stayed with his son in Tokyo until the political situation had settled down in Korea. He returned to Seoul in December.

In April 1883 the first American minister to Korea, General Lucius Foote, stopped in Tokyo en route to his new post in Seoul. He asked Foreign Minister Inoue to help him find a Korean interpreter to take along as a member of his legation staff. Inoue recommended Yun Ch'i-ho who, after a bare three months of instruction, had mastered enough English to communicate on an elementary level. The other applicants could not do as well, and Yun was hired. Foote reported back to Washington: "As interpreter I have engaged the services of a young Korean student who speaks the Chinese and Japanese languages fluently. He is the son of a high official in his own country and was sent here by his government to be educated."⁶

Minister Foote and his party arrived in Korea on June 13, 1883. They found in Seoul a conflict raging between traditional conservatives and a group of reformist officials, many of whom had been to Japan and wanted to adapt Japanese innovations to Korea. Foote knew nothing about internal Korean politics and depended on Yun and his contacts for information. Yun cautioned that the Chinese representatives in Korea would try to prevent establishment of close ties between the American minister and the Korean court. Since Yun's confidences were important, he grew close to both the minister and his wife. When he was not on duty translating he studied English, geography, and history under the Footes' tutelage. On ceremonial and official occasions he stood with Foote in the presence of the king, delighted with the opportunity to be so near the seat of power. But he was not so enamored of the bureaucracy, and, as his remarks to Foote suggest, he was not neutral in his feelings toward the Korean factions of 1883-84. In fact he was a protégé of the reformers, and his contact with them did not cease merely because he was in the employ of a foreign legation. He played a peripheral role in the progressive coup of December 4, 1884. He was associated with the planners⁷ and attended at least one meeting where plans were being laid for the coup.⁸ He had arranged for the coup leader, Kim Ok-kyun, to meet the American minister, and Kim had been entertained at the U.S. legation several times.⁹ He was present, with Lucius Foote, at the banquet where the violent attack occurred. And

his father, Yun Ung-yŏl, was given a post in the short-lived reform cabinet established by the coup.

When the coup was undone after three days and the reform cabinet had fallen, Yun Ung-yŏl was banished to Nŭngju and the central coup plotters fled to Japan. Yun Ch'i-ho stayed on in Foote's employ but he felt that he was in danger and feared to go out on the streets. Lucius Foote resigned his post the next month, and when he left Korea in January 1885 he took Yun Ch'i-ho with him to Nagasaki. As soon as they reached Japan Yun did two things he had never done before: he bought a suit of Western clothes and he cut off his traditional topknot. Then, carrying a letter of introduction from Lucius Foote to the U.S. consul-general in Shanghai, he said goodbye to the minister and his wife, hoarded a China-bound steamer, and began his life in exile. He was twenty years old.¹²

Education Abroad, 1885-94

Yun Ch'i-ho arrived in Shanghai in early February 1885. His sadness at leaving Korea was somewhat offset by his impressions of the Chinese city and the excitement of travel. Shanghai in 1885 was a European city in many ways, more modern and active than Tokyo, and a world apart from Seoul. When he had presented himself at the American consulate Yun took several days just to walk around and become accustomed to his new surroundings.

American officials in Shanghai put Yun in touch with Young J. Allen, the director of the Anglo-Chinese College, a school sponsored by the American Methodist Episcopal church, South.¹³ After talking with Allen, Yun enrolled in the college and began studying mathematics, chemistry, and English. Two years of unsystematic study had given him a basic English vocabulary, but he still needed practice with grammar and the spoken tongue. In Shanghai his English improved rapidly.

The most important development in Yun's life at the Anglo-Chinese College was his conversion to Christianity, in March 1887. His declaration of faith on that occasion is one of the best-known documents in Korean church history.¹⁴

By 1888 Yun had completed the college English course and he was ready to graduate and go home, but conditions in Korea had not

changed. Persons connected with the 1884 coup were still being sought for punishment. Yun's father was still in exile in Nŭngju, and Yun was obliged to seek his future in other quarters. Young J. Allen suggested further study in America and helped him out by introducing him to American Methodist officials and arranging for his admission to the theological school at Vanderbilt University on a church scholarship.

Yun Ch'i-ho's American college career began in November 1888 when he arrived in Nashville. At Vanderbilt he studied theology, English, and speech, spending a happy year in the company of professors whom he admired, on a campus whose atmosphere he enjoyed. But he tired of having to explain the most rudimentary facts about his native country, to point out, for example, that Korea was not a part of China or Japan. He would stress whenever he spoke in public that Korea had its own distinct civilization that deserved recognition and protection from the international community.

Yun kept a diary from 1883 onward, and at Vanderbilt he abruptly started making entries in English, judging that his Korean vocabulary was "not rich enough to express all that I want to say." The diary reflects the breadth of his intellectual activity: his reading of history, his troubled thoughts on racism in America, and his often despairing assessments of Korea's future. One finds a strong American Protestant orientation in his private writings, and his religious ideas seem to have evolved in ways that are remarkable for their conformity to American middle-class values. He seems at times to have made a conscious effort to become like his American classmates in his philosophy. Yet there were times when he was critical of his American environment. He was particularly offended by racial attitudes in the Christian church: "I heard a young man say he would sooner pull down his church than to admit a colored member to the congregation," he wrote. "How is this prejudice compatible with the boasted civilization, philanthropy, religion of this people?" But he saved his most vitriolic language for the Korean regime from which he had escaped four years before, calling the king's councilors an "abominable gang of cut-throats."¹⁵

During this period in his life Yun was constantly exposed to the American missionary movement, and he got caught up in its spirit. He thought that a strong Christian church could pull Korea out of its back-

wardness and corruption, and to this end he campaigned among mission-conscious Americans for funds to start a Southern Methodist mission in Korea. When he left Korea in 1885 there had been only one missionary, a Presbyterian doctor. A few others had come in the intervening years to start evangelistic work. By 1890 Yun thought the time had come for the Southern Methodists to establish at least a mission school.¹⁶ That year he transferred to Emory University near Atlanta, and at the end of his graduate studies there in 1893 he presented a gift of two hundred dollars, his savings from honoraria on his speaking tours, to W. A. Candler, the president of Emory, as the nucleus of a fund with which to endow a Methodist school in Korea.¹⁷

Yun left Emory in 1893, arriving back in Shanghai November 14 to await permission for reentry to Korea. He took a temporary job as an English teacher at the Anglo-Chinese College and in March 1894 married a Chinese teaching assistant named Nora Ma, a match contrived by Yun's mentor, Young J. Allen. Their first child, Nora, was born in Shanghai the following New Year's Eve. Three more children arrived in the next few years: Allen, Candler, and Helen, all born in Korea.¹⁸

Yun's Return to Korea

The political changes in Korea related to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 made it possible for Yun Ch'i-ho and his family to take up a new life in Seoul, settling into a new house in the Yak-hyön district of the city just outside South Gate. Yun took special encouragement from having friends in the new government, which was publicly committed to reform, and from his father having been allowed to come back to Seoul. A father-son audience was granted by King Kojong upon Yun Ch'i-ho's arrival from Shanghai, and the king offered Ch'i-ho an appointment as a cabinet secretary—accepted on the spot.¹⁹ In April Yun was made vice-minister of education; in July he was transferred to be vice-minister of foreign affairs.

The chain of events leading to the assassination of Queen Min in October 1895, and the king's escape to the Russian legation two months later did not involve Yun Ch'i-ho directly. He kept his distance, observing and deploring Korea's extreme weakness in the face of Japanese aggression and Russian interference. He foresaw warfare between

Russia and Japan if a *modus vivendi* between them could not be found. Yet he also believed that if Korea used her best minds, ways could be found to protect her independence. Through these months and years Yun considered the apparent futility of trying to arm Korea without first raising the political consciousness of the people. He believed from the beginning that education must receive the highest priority, that if the Korean people could be made aware of the stakes political action would follow and imperialism would be held at bay. Faith in popular education as the foundation for political strength was an idea then circulating among reform elements in China, and we can assume that Yun's inspiration came not only from his contact with Western ideologies but also from his contact with Chinese thinkers such as Chang Chih-tung and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, whose ideas he must have read in China. Yun received reappointment to the second spot in the Education Ministry in February 1896, which he saw as a precious opportunity to guide a new Korean emphasis on education. But it was not to be. Within a month he was reassigned, this time as secretary to Min Yöng-hwan's embassy to the coronation of Czar Nicholas II. in Moscow.²⁰ He did not return to Korea until January 1897, and then he did not rejoin the government in any policy-making capacity. He spent the next phase of his career in opposition to the establishment and in bringing to fruition his plans to establish a Southern Methodist mission in Korea by giving American missionaries land for a church and school.²¹

Yun Ch'i-ho in the Independence Club

Upon his return home from Russia and Western Europe in 1897, Yun Ch'i-ho found that reformist ideas had found a home in the Independence Club (Ingnip hyöphoe), an association of young officials and intellectuals organized by Sō Chae-p'il. Sō Chae-p'il had been implicated in the 1884 coup and had spent a decade in exile in the United States, absorbing Western political ideas while obtaining a medical education. Sō was pardoned in 1894 and returned to Korea as a government advisor. In April 1896 he founded a small newspaper called *The Independent*, printed partly in English and partly in the Korean *han'gul* script. The paper's editorials stressed reform in farming, education, public safety, and sanitation, but most of all in government, where Sō demanded

popular elections for local officials.²² His ideas attracted a number of younger bureaucrats and in 1896 they formed the Independence Club. They met at Sô's invitation to discuss projects that might be carried out as public examples of self-reliance and development. One of their first accomplishments was the erection of a monument to Korean independence, a stone arch built on the side of the "Gate of Welcoming Blessings" where Korean officials once welcomed Chinese envoys. The club met regularly to discuss political reform, sponsored educational and cultural events, and published a monthly public affairs magazine.²³

When Yun Ch'i-ho first encountered the Independence Club he expressed doubts about it. Writing in his diary on July 25, 1897, he observed:

The club is a farce. It is a conglomeration of indigestible elements. There are Yi Wan-yong and his gang for the time being by some sort of mutual interest. Then there are Pai Won Kun-ites, Russianites, Japanites, royalites, and oth-erites. Each gang group themselves about here and there and an outsider, like myself, finds himself out of place.²⁴

But he soon found his place and became active in the club's work, serving on the editorial board and rising quickly to a key position in the leadership.²⁵

Relations between the government and the Independence Club were cordial at the beginning, and the membership swelled as numerous officials, some holding cabinet rank, joined the club. The king himself showed his favor by donating part of the money to build Independence Arch. Sô Chae-p'il was an effective spokesman and promoter and as long as the club seemed preoccupied with putting up memorial arches and street lights and building parks, occasional political comments by Sô were tolerated easily. But before long Sô openly declared his opposition to the bureaucracy and its policies, alleging corruption and stupidity, denouncing the government's pro-Russian stance in foreign affairs, and condemning the "swarms of self-seeking memorialists" around the throne.²⁶ Under his own by-line he published provocative proposals for administrative reform suggesting, for example, that two thirds of the civil service should be dismissed to save money, since the remaining third could do the same amount of work.²⁷

In contrast to Sô's reckless denunciations of hureaucrats high and low, the club took pains to express support for the throne. Maintenance of this posture of loyal opposition was a special concern of Yun Ch'i-ho, who summarized the club's view of the king as leader of the Korean polity at ceremonies celebrating Kojong's birthday in 1897:

The nation signifies the king, the government, the people, and the territory. Koreans must understand that His Majesty, whose birthday they are celebrating, is their own king and ruler; the council of state and other departments are their own government.²⁸

The Independence Club supported Kojong's elevation from king to emperor in October 1897, and Yun wrote a careful explanation of the political symbolism of the move for the benefit of the foreign community in the English-language *Korean Repository*.²⁹

The Independence Club had its enemies, and one of the first was Alexis deSpeyer, the hot-tempered Russian minister, who objected to *The Independent's* stand against Russian concessions in Korea. DeSpeyer was especially piqued when the club rallied enough support within the government to block the lease of Deer Island (Chôrvông-do) in Pusan harbor to Russia as a coaling station. Early in 1898 the club held public meetings to demand the withdrawal of the Russian military and financial advisers and was instrumental in ending direct Russian involvement in Korean affairs.³⁰

The Independence Club's opposition to Russia at a time when the government's policy was to welcome Russian help accelerated the withdrawal of cabinet ministers and other high officials from its ranks. This defection, which had begun slowly after Sô Chae-p'il's first attacks on the hureaucracy in his newspaper, grew into a stampede when the king let it be known that he was concerned about the extent of the club's influence. Former club members joined conservative officials to oppose the club and pressure against Sô began to build early in 1898. He was dismissed from his post as adviser to the government in May and left Korea shortly after that. Yun Ch'i-ho succeeded him as president of the club and editor of *The Independent*.³¹

Yun Ch'i-ho believed with Sô Chae-p'il that an aroused public was Korea's best guarantee of security and that public education was the

key to solving Korea's ills. Yet the two men's approaches differed. Where Sō seemed intent upon transplanting Western institutions in Korea Yun preferred more gradual reform. Sō felt that the bureaucratic system had to be restructured and entrusted to wise and honest men selected by a democratic process that would make them responsive to the people. This was a radical position for the time, and it left Sō dangerously exposed without allies of any consequence. Sō also lacked Yun Ch'i-ho's easy pragmatism, not caring whom he offended, fighting every battle as if it were the last.³² Yun, on the other hand, while sharing Sō's contempt for corrupt officials, complemented his adopted Western ideals with repeated expressions of patriotic sentiment and loyalty to the king.

For nearly a century past, *seido*, or road to power, was a peculiar institution in Korean politics. Some one of the royal clan or queen's family would, by enjoying the undivided confidence of the king, practically rule the country. . . . Whatever faults the system had, . . . [i]f a *seido* became insufferably bad, there was a hope at least that the fall of the powerful minister might bring better things.

But when the cabinet system was introduced in 1895, there was no room for *seido*. . . . His Majesty has been himself the *seido* and the cabinet. A multitude of irresponsible favorites sprang into existence and instead of one *seido* bleeding the country there have been scores of little *seidos* misleading His Majesty, intriguing against each other and squeezing the people. This was the condition of affairs in the spring of 1898.³³

One of the "irresponsible favorites" was an official named Cho Pyong-sik, a notoriously venal and reactionary official who opposed the Independence Club. He was known as a flatterer and an opportunist and had been a blatant Russian sympathizer as long as the king was in the Russian legation. His appointment as education minister at that time elicited a furious *ad hominem* attack from Sō Chae-p'il in *The Independent*, and Cho had not forgotten it.³⁴ In the summer of 1898 Cho was appointed vice-president of the Privy Council, an extremely sensitive

position from which he could have caused the club incalculable damage. The Independence Club demanded Cho's resignation, which request Cho refused. When the king heard of the dispute he summoned Yun Ch'i-ho to the palace to hear his explanation of the club's position and to ask why it was so determined to cause trouble. Yun replied:

The Independence Club was started under the gracious patronage of Your Majesty. . . . As the institution owes its existence to Your Majesty it is quite within Your august prerogatives to dissolve it if You deem it necessary. But if Your Majesty considers the discussions and petitions of the club as indulgent parents regard the importunities of their children; if Your Majesty, being convinced of the loyalty and patriotism of the club, is unwilling to disband the association, the best thing that may be done is to instruct Your Majesty's ministers and officers to carry out faithfully your benevolent intentions for the good of the people, thus giving to the club no cause for complaint. . . .

When we lived in seclusion with our door shut, the ideas of foreign lands did not affect us. But now that our intercourse with other nations is becoming more and more intimate, the progressive ideas of Japan, Europe and America concerning the relations between the government and the people are daily permeating the various strata of society. Whether good or bad, the opinions and sentiments of our people of 1898 are quite different from the opinions of the first year of Your Majesty's reign [1864]. The government ought to take in the new situation in leading the people, and formulating new laws. This alone will insure success to the government and the welfare of the people. Beyond this I have no more to say to Your Majesty.

The king responded.

Even if there were no demands on the part of the Independence Club, the affairs of the government ought to be conducted aright. We shall instruct the officials of the gov-

ernment to discharge their respective duties faithfully. Tell the members of the club to work on in quiet and orderly ways, steering clear of rashness and giving no occasion for foreign interference.³⁵

Yun's exchange of views with King Kojong brought about the dismissal of Cho Pyông-sik. Yun himself was appointed to take Cho's place and three other members of the Independence Club were appointed to the privy council with him.

This victory encouraged the club to bolder exploits. Its members took on the reigning court favorite, Yi Yông-ik, who held concurrently the posts of director-general of mines, superintendent of the mint, director of the railroads, and controller of ginseng farms. The club petitioned for his dismissal also, and after a long battle in the privy council he was dismissed.

Next the club turned to Sin Ki-sôn,³⁶ the justice minister, whose policies included reviving the old modes of punishment abandoned in 1894—torture, quartering, beheading, confiscation of property, and annihilation of criminals' families. An even more bitter battle resulted in his ouster as well. The club also succeeded in blocking the hiring of a foreign bodyguard for the king, a project put forward by the palace legal adviser, Clarence Greathouse.

Yun Ch'i-ho realized that these accomplishments were all negative; in order to provide a constructive side to the club's program he organized a public airing of the issues, town meeting style, at Chongno Square. The meeting produced six points for presentation to the throne:

1. The government and people are not to rely upon foreign aid.
2. All contractual documents with foreign nations are to have the signatures of the state ministers and the president of the Privy Council.
3. Criminals are to be punished only after public trial and proper defense.
4. The king's appointments should be approved by a majority of the cabinet.
5. All fiscal matters should be consolidated under the finance department, and public records should be kept.
6. Laws should be enforced without discrimination.

Kojong accepted all six points on October 30, 1898, and offered a total of twenty-five places on the privy council to representatives of the Independence Club. The choice was to be made by ballot at a club meeting scheduled for November 5.

With no time to lose, the conservatives struck back. Before dawn on November 5 they persuaded the king to order the arrest of seventeen of the club's leaders. The arresting officers also had instructions to kill Yun Ch'i-ho before the king could change his mind. Yun escaped from home only as his wife delayed his would-be murderers at the front door.³⁷ As dawn broke, Yun learned that Cho Pyông-sik had been reappointed vice-president of the Privy Council. Cho had produced evidence purporting to show that the club had been plotting to overthrow the throne and found a republic. The evidence soon proved to be of Cho's own manufacture, and public outrage at the persecution of the club forced the government to release the prisoners. Street meetings were again called to demand that Cho and his cohorts be punished. On November 21, as Yun put it, "the government decided to solve the problem in a way worthy of Korean statesmanship."³⁸ A band of hired peddlers attacked a meeting of the club and dispersed the participants.³⁹ This was the effective end of the Independence Club. King Kojong publicly offered to punish those responsible for the raid and to adopt the club's proposals "gradually." He appointed club members to various posts, including Yun Ch'i-ho as chief justice of the Seoul Court and mayor of Seoul concurrently.⁴⁰ He banished a number of the club's opponents and had Cho Pyông-sik arrested. For a time there were more popular meetings led by members of the club,⁴¹ and it seemed that there might be a place in the Privy Council for reformist thought after all. But when the radical members pushed too hard to have their people appointed to key positions, despite Yun's advice that they go slower, the king vented his wrath on the organization. On December 26 the king ordered the dissolution of the Independence Club.⁴²

It might be argued that the collapse of the Independence Club was due at least in part to Yun Ch'i-ho's failure to direct it in more constructive ways. It is more likely, however, that no one, except perhaps the king, could have kept a reform organization from being crushed eventually by the weight of vested interest in the bureaucracy. The Independence Club was a superficial phenomenon, a symptom of Korean weakness rather than a remedy for it. It had no effective power base

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Kojong accepted all six points on October 30, 1898, and offered a total of twenty-five places on the privy council to representatives of the Independence Club. The choice was to be made by ballot at a club meeting scheduled for November 5.

With no time to lose, the conservatives struck back. Before dawn on November 5 they persuaded the king to order the arrest of seventeen of the club's leaders. The arresting officers also had instructions to kill Yun Ch'i-ho before the king could change his mind. Yun escaped from home only as his wife delayed his would-be murderers at the front door.³⁷ As dawn broke, Yun learned that Cho Pyông-sik had been reappointed vice-president of the Privy Council. Cho had produced evidence purporting to show that the club had been plotting to overthrow the throne and found a republic. The evidence soon proved to be of Cho's own manufacture, and public outrage at the persecution of the club forced the government to release the prisoners. Street meetings were again called to demand that Cho and his cohorts be punished. On November 21, as Yun put it, "the government decided to solve the problem in a way worthy of Korean statesmanship."³⁸ A band of hired peddlers attacked a meeting of the club and dispersed the participants.³⁹ This was the effective end of the Independence Club. King Kojong publicly offered to punish those responsible for the raid and to adopt the club's proposals "gradually." He appointed club members to various posts, including Yun Ch'i-ho as chief justice of the Seoul Court and mayor of Seoul concurrently.⁴⁰ He banished a number of the club's opponents and had Cho Pyông-sik arrested. For a time there were more popular meetings led by members of the club,⁴¹ and it seemed that there might be a place in the Privy Council for reformist thought after all. But when the radical members pushed too hard to have their people appointed to key positions, despite Yun's advice that they go slower, the king vented his wrath on the organization. On December 26 the king ordered the dissolution of the Independence Club.⁴²

It might be argued that the collapse of the Independence Club was due at least in part to Yun Ch'i-ho's failure to direct it in more constructive ways. It is more likely, however, that no one, except perhaps the king, could have kept a reform organization from being crushed eventually by the weight of vested interest in the bureaucracy. The Independence Club was a superficial phenomenon, a symptom of Korean weakness rather than a remedy for it. It had no effective power base

within Korea; it was primarily a loose association of individuals. It accepted no aid from foreign governments because its guiding principle was "Korea for Koreans." It did not look for support in the dormant Tonghak peasant movement not only because it would have offended the conservatives, but also because it would have been contrary to the enlightened principles of the club to become associated with a backward native religion. The Independence Club, therefore, was in many ways a victim of its own idealism.

When it was over Yun Ch'i-ho looked back on the club with mixed emotions:

Those who hate the club are in full power. Yet I can assure them with a clear conscience that I am not ashamed of having been a member of a society which for the first time in Korean history dared to expose the corruption and wickedness in high places and to teach the downtrodden millions in public that a government is made for the people and not the people for the government. The club may disappear but its principles will live—and work.⁴³

Yun Ch'i-ho Banished to Country Posts

The ultimate source of Yun Ch'i-ho's protection when the Independence Club collapsed was his father's position as minister of war. Through his intercession Yun was never actually arrested or punished. He was, however, removed from his posts in Seoul and reassigned as magistrate of Wonsan.⁴⁴ Yun accepted the assignment in February 1899, knowing that it was a form of banishment, because he felt that it could be turned into an opportunity for political reform in a small region over which he could exercise control.

If Yun felt isolated from the excitement of the capital, he was also free from the corruption of central government officials and the relentless pressures of competing foreign legations. He took bicycle trips in the town and its environs so that he could stop and talk to people along the road. He experimented with town meetings in which he encouraged citizens to suggest how things might be improved. He organized a group of merchants and persuaded them to fund construction of several bridges

in the area so that trade could proceed unhampered during the rainy season. Shortly after arriving he raised funds to begin a school in Wonsan and recruited teachers for it from Seoul. He also helped the Methodist and United Church of Canada missions secure land to open stations.⁴⁵

Yun was in Wonsan a little more than a year on his first tour. During that time his old antagonist, Cho Pyong-sik, kept close track of his work and from time to time had secret inspectors sent to look for wrongdoing. None was found, but the reports did mention Yun's tendency to be influenced by the people in his district. He was called back to Seoul in 1900, and on June 16, he was transferred to the magistracy at Samhwa (Chinnamp'o).

His approach at Samhwa was much the same as it had been at Wonsan, but he was ordered back to Wonsan in 1901 because his successor there had tried to reinstate the spoils system and had caused a public outcry for Yun's return. He stayed in Wonsan for two more years, working along the lines established in his first assignment. The central government also sent him to other nearby areas to settle disputes when they arose. On one occasion a fellow magistrate in Hamhung caused a disturbance by confiscating property for his private use. Yun was told to investigate and he persuaded the official to return the land. Yun's biographer calls these two years the happiest of Yun's life.

The government transferred Yun Ch'i-ho to Ch'onan as county chief (*kunsu*) in 1903. The new assignment was a demotion, in effect, because Ch'onan was a smaller place than Wonsan, a mining area plagued by labor problems. The mayor of Ch'onan town had just been killed while attempting to stop a group of miners from seizing the possessions of local farmers. The mines were run by Japanese, and their virtual immunity from prosecution⁴⁶ had encouraged an atmosphere of lawlessness in the entire region. Yun restored order by arresting every Korean who broke the law or threatened anyone's life or property and by threatening to arrest the Japanese miners and foremen as well. This display of firmness put an end to the worst trouble.

Near the end of 1903 Yun left Ch'onan to receive his next assignment as magistrate of Muan, in Cholla province, a place even smaller than Ch'onan. But before he could depart the capital the appointment

was rescinded and he was ordered instead to the foreign ministry as vice-minister.

Yun Ch'i-ho as Vice-Foreign Minister

The decade from 1895 to 1904 gave Korea its last chance for reform from within. But with the failure of the Independence Club and the collapse of the Tonghak revolt, there ceased to be any organized pressure on the government to put its house in order. The practices condemned so bitterly by Sô Chae-p'il and Yun Ch'i-ho continued. When Yun took office as vice-minister of foreign affairs early in 1904, he found politics in the capital going on as usual, with nascent Japanese power dominating the international scene. Backed by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, Japan was clearly on the verge of a decisive move to assert hegemony over Korea and Manchuria by expelling Russia. Yun's assumption of duties in the foreign ministry coincided with Japan's attack on the Russian fleet and the beginning of Japan's extension of direct control over Korea.

When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904, Japan landed troops in Korea and took immediate military control of the peninsula. Military might enabled her to coerce Korea to sign a series of treaties designed to give Japan more and more control over Korean political affairs. The first agreement, signed on February 23, 1904, gave Japan the right to protect Korea from foreign aggression and internal subversion. Korea was obliged to allow Japanese forces to occupy whatever positions the Japanese deemed to be strategic, to accept Japanese advice for improvement of its administration, and not to seek assistance from any other power. In return the Japanese agreed to protect Korea's royal house and to respect Korea's independence and territorial integrity.⁴⁷

In May 1904 the Japanese cabinet and genrô decided to take control of Korean political and military affairs. On August 19, Korea agreed to employ Japanese-sponsored military and financial advisers. On August 22, in a treaty signed by the Japanese minister, Hayashi Gonsuke, and Yun Ch'i-ho, the acting foreign minister, Korea agreed to consult the Japanese government before concluding any agreement, political or economic, with any other power. The treaty stipulated that Korea would employ a diplomatic adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that

she would deal with other countries only "after his counsel has been taken."⁴⁸

Yun Ch'i-ho fully understood the import of what he was doing when he signed the treaty, yet as acting foreign minister he felt caught between forces over which he had no control. For years he had warned against the internal weakness brought about by the influence of palace favorites over the king. He was convinced even in 1904 that a strong show of unity in the government could keep Korea out of the hands of either of the competing powers. He was aware, however, that no such demonstration was likely, and that the Japanese were going to be able to carry out their plans for the control of Korea without meaningful Korean resistance. After August 1904 Yun watched developments with a growing sense of despair. As Koreans argued among themselves and the world stood by preoccupied with Japan's impending victory in the war, Korea lost the last vestiges of her independence step by step. Japanese military control tightened inexorably as Japanese gendarmes assumed many police functions. In December 1904 the Korean government agreed to let the Japanese enforce Japanese regulations concerning Korea political activity. Early in 1905 the Japanese took over the currency and management of essential communications services, and in October the Koreans agreed to reduce the size of their army to around 8,500 men.

When the Russo-Japanese war ended in September 1905, Japanese hegemony was unchallenged. Russia renounced all further activity in Korea; the United States, which had mediated the settlement of the war, could not be expected to intervene, and the British, having renewed the Anglo-Japanese alliance, supported Japanese control of Korea as a check against Russian expansion. No other power had sufficient interest in Korea to become involved. All that remained for Japan to do was to conclude a treaty with Korea making her a Japanese protectorate. This was done on November 17, 1905, and despite its seeming inevitability it came as a shock to many of Korea's ruling elite. There were demands that the officials who had negotiated the treaty be punished. Some Koreans resigned in protest or committed suicide.⁴⁹

For Yun Ch'i-ho the protectorate treaty was the crowning blow in a series of personal and psychological tragedies. In February 1905 he had suffered the loss of Nora, his wife of ten years, who had been with him

through all the dangers and satisfactions of his civil service career, who had borne him four children, and with whom he had shared all his hopes and ideals for family and society.⁵⁰ Perhaps if Yun had taken the opportunity to retire from politics at that time, he would have avoided becoming identified with the process by which the protectorate was established. But he stayed on in the foreign ministry until it was abolished by the Japanese. Then, discouraged, depressed, and hereaved, he left government service. He was forty years old.

Living in Korea under Japanese Rule

Yun Ch'i-ho and the Enlightenment Movement

Japan did not annex Korea until 1910 but the groundwork for the annexation was laid in 1905, when Korea allowed Japan to establish the protectorate under the control of the Japanese residency-general. From 1905 onward, Japan steadily took over control of more and more functions of the Korean government. King Kojong ruled in name, but it was clear from the outset that the man in charge was Itō Hirohumi, the resident-general, who worked through Japanese officials assigned to the Korean executive departments.

The issue for members of the Korean elite became whether to submit to Japanese rule or to resist it. Many high Korean officials stayed in office for a time by bowing to the Japanese. Many came to tragic ends, discarded by the Japanese and despised by their countrymen after the annexation.⁵¹ Other Korean officials, particularly at local levels, were retained by the Japanese and continued to serve with varying degrees of popularity and success. But the corollary to Japanese rule in Korea in its early phase was the belated awakening of nationalism expressed through the formation of underground organizations, armed revolt, appeals to the international community, and the emergence of an enlightenment movement whose goal was to encourage resistance through education.⁵²

After the protectorate treaty was signed, Yun Ch'i-ho returned to Kaesong to be with his family, but before long he was drawn back into church-related social work. He became a director of the YMCA and traveled to Japan, Europe, and the United States, representing the

Korean Methodist church at conventions of the World Christian Student Federation. His family life regained a sense of normality when he remarried in 1907.

In 1906 he was persuaded by his old friend from Emory University days, W. A. Candler, to found the Methodist school he had talked about so long, and it opened for classes on October 3, 1906.⁵³ A Korean teacher was hired to teach Korean the first term, and Yun himself taught English. When the spring term began in February 1907, there were 100 students, 24 of them from outside the Kaesong area. An expanded curriculum in the school's second year was made possible by the purchase of textbooks: Korean readers, geographies, English primers, and the Bible in a *han'gul* edition. Yun found ample satisfaction in his work with students, he enjoyed being with them and giving them as broad an education as possible in Korea at that time. He led nature hikes and helped the students plant acacia trees on the hills around the school. He spent hours making plans for his school, which he hoped would serve one day as a model for others.⁵⁴

One of Yun Ch'i-ho's important contributions to modern Korean education was his conviction that vocational education should be placed on a par with the humanities. This dual, practical emphasis helped make the Kaesong school a unique institution in later years when departments were added for special training in textile manufacture and dairy farming.

Another, less publicized, area of Yun's activity in these years was his part in enlightenment movement organizations. The enlightenment (*kyemong*) movement inherited many characteristics of the Independence Club, although it was larger and more diffuse. *Kyemong* organizations held public lecture meetings and published small magazines through which they taught Korean history and spread information about nationalist movements in other countries.⁵⁵ Although Japanese press censorship was not yet in force, they did not often mention Japan or make direct references to plans for organized resistance. Such organizations proliferated rapidly, and there were thirty-six by 1910.⁵⁶

Yun Ch'i-ho belonged to several. He helped to found the Taehan Chaganghoe (Korea Self-Strengthening Society) in 1906 and served as its chairman. In 1908 he helped establish the Sinminhoe (New People's Society). Both groups were organized to disseminate information about

Koreans were joining the Christian church in order to use it as a front for continued resistance. The indictments suggest that the Japanese were putting the church on notice that it was not immune from prosecution because of its foreign contacts.⁶³

It is probably impossible to determine the veracity of the charges. Whatever the case the Japanese seem to have used the trial to demonstrate what lay in store for those who had notions of further opposition to Japanese colonial rule.⁶⁴ The conspiracy trial was conducted in Seoul in a specially constructed courtroom designed to accommodate all the defendants and up to 200 spectators. The judges wore uniforms, giving the court an atmosphere of military severity that relaxed somewhat only as the trial stretched out over months.⁶⁵ Each defendant was examined in turn by the procurator and by Japanese and Korean defense lawyers. Other witnesses were not allowed to testify despite repeated motions by the defense.

Because Yun Ch'i-ho was alleged to be the leader of the conspiracy, the prosecution made its most elaborate case against him. The case began with Yun's well-known participation in the *Sinminhoe* as its president some years before. The prosecution then proceeded to submit statements signed by other defendants in the trial that showed that the *Sinminhoe* had merely gone underground when ordered to disband in 1909 and that it had continued to meet secretly in Seoul and P'yŏng-yang. According to the statements, Yun had chaired a series of meetings at which the assassination plot had been developed, and he had approved the final plans in December 1910. As soon as he learned of Terachi's proposed trip he had relayed details of the itinerary to associates in P'yŏngyang and had assigned them to carry out the assassination on December 28.

The prosecution based its entire case upon confessions. Many of the defendants had admitted during the investigation that they had been active in the plot. Once on the witness stand they denied the charges and withdrew the confessions, claiming that the police had tortured them or promised their release in order to get them to admit their participation. Several times during the trial defendants offered to show the court the scars left by the police during the interrogations. The judges always declined to look. Yun Ch'i-ho, like the others, claimed his con-

fession was false; he had confessed, he said, in order to absolve the others of guilt, and then only after many long hours of questioning. Yun's two Japanese lawyers argued that he was temperamentally incapable of planning or executing a murder, that he was a Christian who lived by his principles and would not commit murder because it was immoral. They cited Yun's trips to Japan as a student, his long association with progressive forces allied with Japan, and his stand against Russia while in the Independence Club, all to prove that he was not anti-Japanese. He was a realist, they said, who fully understood how futile an assassination would be. It was obvious, they continued, that the confessions had been brought out by torture, forced from exhausted men who feared for their lives. They concluded by noting that since there was no other evidence the charges should be dismissed.⁶⁶ Their motion failed.

The judgment of the Keijō Local Court was delivered on September 28, 1912. Sixteen men were acquitted. The remaining 105 were sentenced to prison terms ranging from five to ten years. Yun Ch'i-ho and five others received the maximum sentence.

The conspiracy case was reviewed between November 26, 1912, and February 25, 1913, in the Keijō Appeals Court. Ninety-nine of the defendants were acquitted in this judgment and the remaining six had their sentences reduced; Yun's term was reduced to six years. The date of his release was set for November 24, 1918. The case was heard again in the Faikyū (Taegu) Appeals Court and yet again in the Higher Court of the government-general. Both upheld the earlier verdict.⁶⁷

During Yun Ch'i-ho's time in prison his privileges as a peer and all his civil rights were suspended.⁶⁸ He left no record of those four years except for a few hymns that he wrote, and he never spoke even to his children about his life in confinement. A few missionaries were permitted to see him from time to time. R. A. Hardie, whom he had known since his days in Wŏnsan, sometimes took him food and reported back that he was being overworked and underfed and that he lacked sufficient clothing.⁶⁹

In 1914 there was a special amnesty in Korea to mark the death of the Empress Shōken. The conspiracy case prisoners were among those who had their sentences reduced at that time. Then, on February 10,

1914, the emperor, "by reason of his great love and mercy," pardoned the six men and set them free. Word of the imperial pardon reached Yun on February 13 in the form of a notice from the governor-general Terauchi and a formal warning not to become involved in any further resistance activities. The notice concluded with these words:

I believe that Yun Ch'i-ho and his five fellow prisoners are intelligent enough to see and understand that acts of resistance will be met with sterner measures, and hope that, seeing that they have shown themselves sincerely penitent of their past conduct, they will, after they have been released, not only behave themselves correctly but take up the right cause of life, becoming good and respected citizens in order to respond to the boundless favor shown them by the Emperor.⁷⁰

That afternoon, with his freedom restored and the title he had inherited from his father returned, Yun Ch'i-ho walked out of prison. He was fifty years old.

Living with the Japanese

When Yun Ch'i-ho emerged from prison in 1915 he was technically a free man, yet like many of his friends he had to weigh his future course of action very carefully. He had already paid the price for being known as a leader of the resistance movement. Since he knew that if he wanted to accomplish anything farther with his life, he would have to stay out of politics for good, he did not rejoin the underground nationalist movement. He did not even participate in the nationwide independence demonstrations of March 1919.⁷¹ Although he was investigated repeatedly over the years by the Japanese police, he did not run afoul of the authorities again.

Yun lived through the entire Japanese occupation of Korea and died in his eighty-first year on December 6, 1945. His last days were unhappy, for like many others he was subjected to widespread accusations of collaboration with the Japanese. He was open to these charges because the Japanese forced his father's title of nobility upon him and even gave him a seat in the House of Peers in April 1945. For thirty

years he walked a political tightrope, and it is likely that he would have come under fire no matter how he had conducted himself. From 1910 onward the question of resistance versus acquiescence or collaboration was a dilemma faced by all Korean leaders.

Such problems were set aside momentarily when Yun regained his freedom in 1915. Naturally enough he spent the first few months in Kaesŏng, surrounded by his wife and children, and he found his strength returning quickly. Before long his family began to grow; by 1928 there were twelve children in all. The family lands in Kaesŏng, Asan, and Wŏnsan, and the fortune left by Yun Ung-yŏl provided for the family's needs. In the next two decades several children went abroad to study: Allen went to Ohio University, Candler and Chang-sŏn went to Emory, and Ki-sŏn studied at the Ueno Music School in Tokyo. Several daughters attended Ehwa Women's College in Seoul.⁷² Yun spared no efforts to give his own children the best possible education.

In 1916 he began applying his creative energies to church-related organizations. In May he assumed leadership of the YMCA, which prior to 1916 had been regarded by the Japanese as a subversive organization and had been weakened by factional strife in its leadership. Yun was able to smooth over the internal problems and obtained the government-general's permission to expand into other cities and to begin a rural education program.

In 1922 Yun returned to Kaesŏng to resume work at his school, then called the Songdo Higher Common School. While he had been in prison enrollment had dropped off sharply to 224. By 1921 it had come back up to 953. In the same interval two new classroom buildings were built, a second dormitory was added, and new facilities were installed for a science department, a simple textile factory with power looms, and an electrical generating plant. In 1921 there was a new administration building. Soon after Yun returned to the school as its president, his son Allen returned from the United States to establish a dairy as part of the school's vocational training program. Yun Ch'i-ho set about raising funds and by 1925 he had 50,000 yen in contributions from the government-general's education budget, the Methodist mission, numerous small donors, and himself. He set aside half as a reserve fund and used the other 25,000 yen to build a dining hall, to buy animals for the dairy, to

find a sports program, and to establish vocational training scholarships. By his sixtieth year, he had built his school into a major institution and made it self-supporting. A year later, 1925, he turned his school over to younger assistants.⁷³

Yun Ch'i-ho's influence on education in Korea was felt long after his retirement. He continued to serve on the boards of several schools and colleges, including Ehwa Women's College and Severance Union Medical School, both in Seoul. With friends he established a small publishing firm that financed educational and religious materials, including a translation of the Bible by James S. Gale.⁷⁴ He continued on the board of the YMCA. In 1925, with his old friend Yi Sang-jae, he started the Taep'yongyang yon'guso (Pacific Research Institute), a study group composed of men who wanted to discuss religion, education, and current affairs.⁷⁵ He revised and published the translation of *Robert's Rules of Order*, which he had first done back in the days of the Independence Club. He wrote occasional magazine articles giving his view of events in the late nineteenth century, though he avoided writing about anything after 1900. He also wrote from time to time in missionary publications.⁷⁶

In his writings on education Yun again revealed that mixture of Western progressivism and Korean traditionalism that had guided his activities in the Independence Club before 1900. On one hand, though he admitted Confucianism had given Korea its standards of duty and morality, he deplored some of its other effects. "A system of ethics yielding the fruit of agnosticism, selfishness, arrogance, despotism, and degradation of women can not be pronounced a good one. If other countries can make better use of it, Korea is, or ought to be, willing to part with it—the sooner the better."⁷⁷ He condemned such traditional concepts as *unsu*, the Korean idea of fatalism, believing that they encouraged Koreans to accept foreign domination. "Until you give up the word *unsu*," Yun once said, "there is no hope. It is nonsense. There is no such thing. Every man is his own *unsu*, and can make of life what he will."⁷⁸ As a devout Christian Yun believed that faith in God and belief in the will of God should replace the old Confucian pattern. Yet he saw no point in substituting Western classicism for Chinese. He preferred to stick to the nuts-and-bolts of mechanical and scientific skills, which he

thought Korea needed most. He thought graduates of Western-style schools who emerged with liberal arts degrees faced the same social problems and attitudes as graduates of the old examination system, and he saw vocational training as the antidote:

Fortunately, the kinds of industry which the Korean needs most today are such as can be taught with comparatively little outlay of capital. The simple principles and practical methods of horticulture, or fruit raising, or dairy, etc. can be easily taught and learned. . . . Carpentry, bamboo works, tin smithery, handlooms, shoemaking, candle-making, soap-making . . . are some of the industries which will give many a hoy and home something to live on.⁷⁹

His view of women's education, by contrast, carried the idea of vocational training full circle. Rather than advocating schooling that would liberate girls from the prospect of bondage in the home, he criticized the way modern Korean schools stressed literary studies to the detriment of traits desirable in Korean women. A woman's place was strictly in the home:

It has been, and is, my firm belief that it is more useful for a Korean girl to learn, besides reading and writing, to cook and sew well rather than to play on the piano—for the simple reason that she will have far more occasions to cook and sew than to play on the piano in a Korean home. . . . Teach the abacus more thoroughly than algebra. Cultivate the taste for flowers and pictures rather than waste time dabbling in astronomy and botany.⁸⁰

Such writings reflect the mixture of ideas that guided Yun Ch'i-ho through most of his life. He was progressive and conservative at the same time. To the end he was a man of many paradoxes, and no label is sufficient to characterize his life and contribution to Korean modernization. That he made a contribution is clear from the success of the organizations he helped build. Christian schools, the YMCA, and the Korean Methodist church. He deserves his reputation for moderate leadership during a time when extremists were punished harshly. In his early

years he was a political reformer, at times verging on the radical, later on, his reformist ideas found expression in ways that did not directly threaten the colonial regime. The turning point was the conspiracy trial, which succeeded in demonstrating the capacity of the Japanese to disrupt the lives of persons who tried to subvert it. This lesson, of course, was demonstrated far more forcefully in 1919. Yun's personal answer to the dilemma of resistance versus collaboration was to choose the path of acquiescence and his choice has been the subject of much controversy. Yet the fact remains that he stayed in Korea when other, more vocal nationalists were forced to live abroad where many of the day-to-day problems of living under the Japanese could be avoided. Small wonder that Yun Ch'i-ho looked on with bitter amusement as overseas Koreans came flocking back home after World War II to claim the spoils.

It is really amusing to see some of the self-appointed saviors of Korea and their satellites swagger about everywhere talking big as if they had saved Korea from Japanese militarism. . . . These braggarts talk very much like the silly fly, in a fable, which perched on a running cart and exclaimed that it, by its own power, made the wheels move.⁸¹

In Yun's view the Korea of 1945 was not really ready for the circumstances that had overtaken it, and in the last months of his life he viewed with growing despair the trend toward demagoguery on one hand and the gloved fist of American-Soviet Occupation on the other. He was concerned that open democracy in Korea would degenerate into chaos or dictatorship:

What Korea needs today is a benevolent paternalism. I wish some strong man would arise who could, with a firm hand and unselfish devotion, keep the demagogues and communists from imposing, on the uneducated and undisciplined masses of Korea, the mere forms and slogans of democracy, on one hand and on the other the atrocities and absurdities of communism. We Koreans are not yet politically prepared for pure democracy or radical communism. We are in great danger of

mistaking unbridled license for liberty and brigandage for communism.⁸²

Yun Ch'i-ho died in December 1945 and so did not live to see what was in store for his country: continued division, war, and revolution. Yet even in the twilight of his life his thoughts were prescient and deserve to be repeated:

Let us frankly admit and thank the stars that the liberation was a gift. With gratitude and humility let us accept the gift like a lost jewel relound, and try our best not to lose it again. Let us sink all petty personal ambitions, factional intrigues and sectional hatred and pull together for the common good of our suffering country. Korea, from her geographical situation, popular ignorance and factional discords faces no roseate future.⁸³

NOTES

1. Kim Yōng-hūi, *Chwaonq Yun Ch'i-ho sōnsaeng yakchōn* [A short biography of Yun Ch'i-ho] (Kŏjō, 1934), p. 21 (hereafter cited as Kim, *Yakchōn*).

2. Yi Hūi-sūng et al., eds., *Mansōng taedongbo* [Compendium of Korean genealogies], p. A-274-h.4a.; *Han'guk umyōng taesajōn* [Biographical encyclopedia of Korea] (Seoul, 1967), p. 563 (hereafter cited as HIMSJ), and Kim, *Yakchōn*, pp. 9-21. Yun Ung-yōl's lineage in the Haep'yōng Yun clan was not particularly distinguished but other lines in the same clan were known for great success in the examinations. In the nineteenth century at least one Haep'yōng Yun married into the royal family (to the daughter of King Sunjo). In the twentieth century the last queen of Korea (Sunjong's second queen) was a Haep'yōng Yun. Yun Ung-yōl's wife was descended from a branch of the royal Chōnju Yi clan.

3. See C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-kyo Kim, *Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 33-44 (hereafter cited as Kim and Kim).

4. There is a record of a conversation between Fukuzawa Yukichi and Yun Ch'i-ho in Kim, *Yakchōn*, p. 30, in which Fukuzawa encouraged Yun to study English because America was likely to be important to Korea in the

future. Beyond this there is little to suggest a special relationship between Fukuzawa and Yun except for the influence Fukuzawa exerted upon the Korean reform group in general.

5. See biographical sketch of Nakamura Masanao (1832-91) in *Shakai kaakun daijiten*, 20 vols. (Tokyo, 1968), 14:177-78.

6. Yun acted as interpreter for Kim Ok-kyun on the latter's visit to Japan in 1882.

7. [IMTS], p. 563, Yi Kwang-nin, *Han'guk kaehwasa yon'gu* [Historical studies of the Korean reform movement] (Seoul, 1969), p. 261.

8. Foote also listed Yun in his formal list of legation staff later in the year. "Mr. [Yun Ch'i-ho] is a young Korean who is studying English under my instruction. He will with the consent of his government be permanently attached to this legation as interpreter." Foote to Frelinghuysen, dispatches no. 4 (Yokohama, May 1, 1883) and no. 10 (Seoul, June 29, 1883), in U.S. National Archives, *Dispatches from United States Ministers to Korea*, File Microcopies of Records in the National Archives, 1949, no. 134, reel 1.

9. Yun Ch'i-ho knew Kim Ok-kyun from his student days in Japan, when he had acted as Kim's interpreter (1882). Kim and several other central coup planners held posts in the foreign office where Yun was a minor secretary.

10. He attended a meeting of the planners on November 10, 1884, at Kim Ok-kyun's house, Yi Kwang-nin, p. 242. Itô Hirohumi, ed., *Chōsen kōshō shiryō* [Documents concerning diplomatic relations with Korea], 3 vols. (Tokyo, 1970), I, 439.

11. One such meeting was arranged so that Kim Ok-kyun could meet Robert S. McClay, an officer of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist church in the United States, who was in Korea in 1884 to investigate the possibilities for mission work. Kim wanted to encourage McClay to start work in Korea because he felt it would strengthen the reform party's position. McClay stayed at the U.S. legation a long time, and spoke to Yun on a number of occasions. It is likely that this was Yun's first direct exposure to the tenets of Christianity that later became so important in his life. Kim, *Yakchōn*, p. 41.

12. Kim, *Yakchōn*, pp. 48-49.

13. The Anglo-Chinese School was founded in 1883 by Young J. Allen as a mission school designed primarily to teach English and the Chinese classics. In 1885 it was expanded and upgraded to college level. Later on it merged with Soochow University. Many of its graduates went on to government posts and into foreign businesses—medicine and the professions. Jessie Gregory Lutz, *China and the Christian Colleges, 1850-1950* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 34, 69-495; Warren A. Candler, *Young J. Allen* (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931), pp. 154-55. Allen is known not only as a

missionary educator but also for his contributions in translating and editing Western literature for publication in China. During the American Civil War he was forced to support himself in China by this kind of work. He founded a magazine that grew into an important source of Western ideas and contributed to the ideology of the reform movement in the 1890s. John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: The Modern Transformation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 364. Allen is also known for the translations he did with John Fryer for the Shanghai Kiangnan Arsenal. Others of Allen's translations are appended to Wei Yuan, *Hai kuo t'u chih* [Illustrated gazetteer of the overseas countries], Arthur W. Hummel, ed., *Imperial Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 851.

14. See text of the declaration in L. George Paik [Paek Nak-chun], *The History of Protestant Missions in Korea, 1832-1910* (P'yongyang, 1929), pp. 156-57.

15. *Han'guksa p'yōnch'an wiwōnhoe*, *Yun Ch'i-ho ilgi* (Seoul, 1973), I, 407, 408, 409.

16. Kim, *Yakchōn*, pp. 60-62.

17. T. H. Yun [Yun Ch'i-ho], "Thirty Years Ago," in *Southern Methodism in Korea*, ed. J. S. Ryang (Seoul, 1926), pp. 98-99.

18. Candler, *Young J. Allen*, pp. 162-63; Kim, *Yakchōn*, pp. 67-68. Miss Ma's given name is difficult to pin down. Korean missionary sources refer to her as Louise Mo. Yun's biographer always refers to her as Ma Nora, or simply as Ma Putn. Laura Haygood Yun was named for Laura Askew Haygood, the first director of the McTear Home and School for Girls (Shanghai), from which Nora Ma graduated. See Candler, *Young J. Allen*, p. 158, and Charles A. Sauer, ed., *Within the Gate* (Seoul, 1934), p. 33. Her Korean name was Pong-hūi. The two boys were named for Young J. Allen and Warren A. Candler, respectively, as Yun's way of honoring his two most influential counselors. Allen Yun's Korean name was Yōng-sōn, Candler's Kwang-sōn, and Helen's Yong-hūi.

19. The post was *Hjōngbu ch'amūi* (rank 3a). Kim, *Yakchōn*, p. 80.

20. His rank was *Chungch'uwōn ūiquan* (Privy Councillor). Kim, *Yakchōn*, p. 106. In addition to mission chief Min Yōng-hwan and secretary Yun, the mission included the Russian expert Kim T'ong-il, secretary Kim Tok-sŏn, and Min Yong-hwan's personal servant (unnamed). Kim, *Yakchōn*, p. 101.

21. Ryang, *Southern Methodism*, pp. 15-18. Yun Ung-yōl donated a thousand yen to the mission school project. Yun Ch'i-ho donated funds for a church meeting house in Koyang and interceded with the magistrate of Kaesōng to allow the mission to purchase land. Yun obtained the funds to buy land from his maternal uncle, who was a wealthy merchant. Kim Yōng-hūi, "A Short Sketch

of Dr. I. H. Yun's Life," *The Korea Mission Field* 31, no. 3 (March 1935): 49.

22. *The Independent*, April 14, 1896. See also Clarence Norwood Weems, "The Korean Reform and Independence Movement, 1881-1898" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1954), pp. 277-359, Vipin Chandra, "The Independence Club (1896-1898): Its Place in Korean History," (seminar paper, Harvard University, 1971), *passim*, Kim To-tae *Sô Chae-p'il Paksa ūi chasôjôn* [A short autobiography of Sô Chae-p'il] (Seoul, 1948), pp. 149-66; and Channing Liem, *America's Finest Gift to Korea: The Life of Philip Jaisohn* (New York: William-Frederick Press, 1952), pp. 19-51. See also the editorial, "Korea for Koreans," *The Independent*, April 7, 1896, p. 1. The newspaper was financed by a grant of 5 000 yen raised by Yu Kil-chun shortly before he was forced to flee Korea upon the collapse of the pro-Japanese cabinet in early 1896. The new cabinet honored Yun's arrangements to finance the newspaper.

23. Yun Ch'i-ho "Tongnip Hyôphoe ūi s'ijong" [The Independence Club from beginning to end], in *Simjông Silgi* [Records of King Sunjong's reign], ed. Yun Yong-gu (Keijô, 1926), pp. 57-59, *idem*, "The Independence Club," *The Korean Review* (hereafter cited as KR) 5 (1898): 281-87, and Paek Sun-jae, "Tongnip Hyôphoe wôlbo wa ka'ông chapchi" [The Independence Club magazine and domestic publications], *Sasanggye* 13, no. 9 (September 1965): 270-79.

24. Quoted in Shin Yong-ha, "Tongnip hyôphoe ūi ch'angnip kwa chojik" [Origins and organization of the Independence Club], in *Ch'angchak kwa pip'yônq* 9, no. 1 (Spring 1974): 174.

25. Kim, *Yakchôn*, pp. 116-18.

26. *The Independent*, February 16, 1897, p. 1.

27. Philip Jaisohn [Sô Chae-p'il], "Korean Finance," KR 3 (1896): 167-68.

28. *The Independent*, August 26, 1897, p. 1.

29. Yun Ch'i-ho, "The Whang-ê het of Dai Han, or the Emperor of Korea," KR 4 (1898): 385-90.

30. Weems, "Korean Reform," pp. 360-472, Chandra, "The Independence Club," pp. 29-31.

31. By late 1897 *The Independent* was being delivered to every part of Korea, issues were shared by many readers, and the paper had become an effective means of exposing corruption and misgovernment. KR 4 (1897): 472-73.

32. As Homer Hulbert noted "Dr. Jaisohn was blunt and outspoken in his advice to His Majesty and it was apparent that the latter listened with growing impatience to suggestions which however excellent in themselves found no response in his own inclinations." Homer B. Hulbert, *The Passing of Korea* (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1906), p. 154.

33. Yun Ch'i-ho "Popular Movements in Korea," KR 5 (1898): 465. The

material that follows here is mainly Yun's view of the Independence Club and events surrounding it as expressed in this article, unless otherwise cited.

34. "The new Minister of Justice," wrote Sô, "has a record which would make any denizen of the slums of the world blush to think of. . . . It seems that the government encourages crimes of all kinds and it further shows that flattering, bribes, and servile obedience can frustrate honor, justice, decency, and self-respect." *The Independent*, December 17, 1896, p. 1.

35. *The Independent*, July 26, 1896, p. 1.

36. HIMTSJ, p. 397. Sun Ki-sôn is also remembered for *The Warp and Wool of Confucianism*, a textbook he published while minister of education in 1896. This book heaped abuses upon the "barbarous teachings" of Christianity, on Westerners in general, and on the Japanese, while according China the traditional position of "the center of civilization." The book was soon withdrawn after protests from Western legations. KR 3 (1896): 421.

37. Kim, *Yakchôn*, p. 124.

38. Yun, "Popular Movements," p. 468.

39. *Pobusang*, or *pubosang*, "bundle and backload traders," were organized into guilds during the Yi dynasty. These peddlers traveled widely in their trades and had a long tradition of serving the government as gatherers of information about local areas. When the government needed strong-arm tactics it felt free to call upon the guild to apply whatever unofficial force was necessary—thus the attack upon the Independence Club by the peddlers' guild. "The Peddlers' Guild," KR (August 1903), pp. 337-42.

40. *Yijo sillok Kojong sillok* [Veritable records of the Yi dynasty: The reign of Kojong] (Chosôn Kwahagwôn/Chung Kuo K'o Hsueh Yuan ed.), 9 vols. (Peking, 1959), 7:158, 165.

41. Yun said that they "acted against sober advice and became careless and imprudent." Some of them offended powerful conservatives yet one more time and were arrested again. Yun, "Popular Movements," pp. 468-69.

42. See Vipin Chandra, "The Independence Club and Korea's First Proposal for a National Legislative Assembly," this volume.

43. Yun, "Popular Movements," p. 469.

44. Material on Yun Ch'i-ho's provincial posts is taken from Kim, *Yakchôn*, pp. 139-55, unless otherwise cited.

45. Richard Rutt, *James Scarth Gale and His History of the Korean People* (Seoul, 1972), p. 32.

46. These were gold mines, originally given to the Americans as a concession and then sold by the Americans to a Japanese company. Japanese citizens in Korea enjoyed the protection of the extraterritoriality clause of the 1876 Japan-Korea treaty (the Kanghwa Treaty). They could be arrested by Korean authorities, but they could only be tried by a Japanese consular court.

47. Text in *Kankoku Tôkântu* [Residency-General of Korea], *Kankoku ni*

hansuru jōyaku oyobi hōrei [Treaties and laws pertaining to Korea] (Tokyo, 1906), pp. 15–16.

48. Kim and Kim, pp. 121–29. For text of the agreement see Kankoku Tōkanfū, *Kankoku ni hansuru jōyaku oyobi hōrei*, p. 17. For Yun Ch'i-ho's part in the signing see Kim, *Yakchōn*, pp. 165–66, and Yi Sōn-gūn, *Minjok ūi sōmg wanq* [The brightness of our nation], 2 vols. (Seoul, 1968), 2: 346.

The foreign adviser appointed by the Japanese was Durham Stevens, an American employee of the Japanese foreign office, chosen presumably to lessen the reaction of the other powers to Japanese control. Stevens was assassinated by a Korean in 1907, while he was passing through San Francisco.

49. Among the suicides was Min Yōng-hwan, the envoy whom Yun Ch'i-ho had accompanied to Russia in 1896. Min's suicide note is found in KR 6 (1906) 6–7.

Yun Ch'i-ho was not directly involved in the signing of the treaty, though many of his friends were.

50. She died on February 10, 1905, in Severance Hospital and was buried in Seoul's cemetery for foreigners on February 13. Her funeral was well attended by Koreans from all walks of life and by foreign missionaries and members of the diplomatic corps. See note in KR 5 (1905) 72, and memorial article by J. R. Moose in *The Korea Methodist*, 1, no. 5 (March 1905) 51–52.

51. Not all were corrupt or reactionary. A good many were men of liberal, or at least nontraditional, persuasions. The most vilified after 1910 was Yi Wan-yong, a charter member of the Independence Club, who as prime minister in 1910 put his signature to the annexation treaty. Another was Pak Yōng-hyo, a central figure in the reform coup of 1884. There were others as well. It would be interesting to analyze the decisions of these men, many of whom began at the same point (young students going to Japan with the observation group of 1881), contributed to the reform movement in various ways, and then ended up on opposite sides of the annexation question in 1910.

52. Works on the period of Japanese protectorate include Hilary Conroy, *Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868–1910* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), 325–82, where the emphasis is upon Itō's attempt to carry out a moderate policy, and Kim and Kim, pp. 136–218, where the emphasis is upon Japanese objectives and Korean resistance on several fronts. The Japanese public policy was to reform and reorganize the Korean political and economic system so that Korean domestic disintegration would cease and not pose a security threat to Japan by creating a power vacuum. A sympathetic account of Itō Hirobumi's administration in Korea is George Trumbull Ladd, *In Korea with Marquis Ito* (London: Longmans and Co., 1908). A summary of the resistance movement and the Korean king's appeals for help from abroad is Frederick Arthur McKenzie, *Korea's Fight for Freedom* (London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co., 1920). McKenzie's book, together with his earlier work, *The Tragedy*

of Korea (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1908), are representative of the publications written as part of the international appeal.

53. Candler told him that the fund had increased from Yun's original \$200 to a sufficient amount to begin a school, \$1,500, through interest and additional small contributions. W. D. Lim, "Songdo Higher Common School," in *Southern Methodism*, ed. Ryang, p. 104.

54. T. H. Yun [Yun Ch'i-ho], "The Anglo-Korean School, Songdo," *The Korea Mission Field Magazine* (hereafter cited as KMF) 3, no. 9 (September 1907): 145; Kim, *Yakchōn*, p. 198.

55. For the influence of the Independence Club's ideology upon these magazines see Paek San-jae, "Tongnip Hyōphoe," pp. 275–79.

56. Japanese policy toward such groups, moving in phases from studied indifference to outright suppression, is examined in Chōng-ik Kim, "The Techniques of Political Power: Japan in Korea, 1905–1910" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1959). See also George McGrane, *Korea's Tragic Hours*, ed. Harold F. Cook and Alan M. MacDougall (Seoul, 1973), p. 72. There were other groups founded by Koreans to advance the Japanese cause in much the same manner. Of these, the best known is the Hchinhoe, supported in large measure by Uchida Ryōhei's *Kokuryūkan*. See Vipin Chandra, "An Outline Study of the Hchinhoe (Advancement Society) of Korea," in *Occasional Papers on Korea, Number Two*, ed. James B. Palais (Joint Committee on Korean Studies of the ACLS and the Social Science Research Council, April 1974), and Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 67–71.

57. Ladd, *In Korea with Marquis Ito*, p. 38.

58. Sonu Ilun, *Minjok ūi sūman. Paek-o ni sakōn* [The suffering of our nation: the conspiracy trial] (Seoul, 1955), pp. 118–19. Yi Kwang-su, "Tosan An Ch'ang-ho," in *Yi Kwang-su chōnchip* [Collected works of Yi Kwang-su], 20 vols. (Seoul, 1964), 13: 23–39. Yun's biography, published in 1934, omits entirely any discussion of Yun's part in these two organizations. There are chapter headings for them on pages 179 and 180, but in each case they are followed by cryptic notations indicating that 105 lines have been deleted from the *Chaganhoe* chapter and 769 lines deleted from the next chapter, untitled, but presumably dealing with the *Sinminhoe*. Investigation of Yun's activities in these organizations will have to wait until his diaries are released.

Short sketches of the two organizations are found in Yi Hong-jik, ed., *Kuksa taesajōn* [Historical encyclopedia of Korea], 2 vols. (Seoul, 1963), 1: 413, 833. For information on the Epworth League see Paik, *Protestant Churches in Korea*, pp. 167, 339–40.

59. Ladd continues: "It was not, of course, to be expected that a Korean Yang-han should willingly confess the demonstrated incapacity of the Korean nation for self-government, even less, perhaps, that he should assist the

Japanese in doing for his own people what they never have done, and never could do for themselves. But that intelligent native Christians should take an attitude of passive opposition to offers of assistance on matters of education, morality, and religion from a friendly foreigner. . . simply because that foreigner was the guest of the Japanese Resident-General, shows how characteristic and deep-seated are the obstacles which the official class are opposing to the redemption of Korea." Ladd, *In Korea with Marquis Ito*, p. 39.

However, another observer in the same period who is also noted for his low opinion of the Koreans' ability to govern themselves, George F. Kennan, thought that Yun Ch'i-ho would be an ideal man for the Japanese to appoint as minister of home affairs and supervisor of the national police. Quoted in Andrew Grajdanzev, *Modern Korea* (New York: John Day Co., 1944), p. 36.

60. Government-General of Chōsen, *Annual Report on Progress and Reforms in Chosen (Korea), 1910-1911* (Seoul, 1912), pp. 18-19. See also C. Kenneth Quinones, "The Korean Nobility List of 1910. A Social and Political Study" (Seminar paper, Harvard University, 1971), p. 7.

61. See Ōmura Tomonojo, *Chōsen kizoku reiden* [Biographies of Korean nobles] (Seoul, 1910), pp. 214-15.

At the time of the annexation Yun Ch'i-ho was given the honorary rank of *Chuhōn taebu* (3a), as a symbolic promotion. Kim, *Yakchōn*, p. 208.

62. Government-General of Chōsen, *Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen (Korea), 1912-1913* (Keijō, 1914), p. 56. A complete list of the defendants, with age and home town, is found in Sōm, *Mujok ū Sunan*, pp. 124-25.

63. Underlying the trial there was an implication of complicity in the plot by American missionaries. Sōnch'ōn was a mission station with a school, and the Japanese maintained that the school's principal, George McCune, had encouraged the plot by preaching a sermon on the story of David and Goliath. McCune and several others were also accused indirectly of collecting and storing weapons in their houses for the conspirators to use. The missionaries in Sōnch'ōn took a deep personal interest in the trial. George McCune was never formally charged in the prosecution's statements but his name was often mentioned in testimony. McCune believed that the charges were false and that the trial was designed to intimidate the church and to force it to accept Japanese rule in Korea. He attended the trial nearly every day, and he arranged for the American editor of the *Japan Chronicle* in Kobe to come to Korea in order to report it for the world press. The daily reports were compiled and published separately, as a book. *Japan Chronicle, The Korean Conspiracy Trial* (Kobe, 1913), 445 pp. Many observers believe that foreign publicity was an important factor in the Japanese decision to dismiss most of the defendants and to reduce the sentences of the rest. On the other hand, seeing what the Japanese were capable of doing to their converts, missionaries who had been careless

in speaking out against the Japanese began exercising more prudence. Missionary relations with the Japanese improved somewhat after the trial.

64. The trial is mentioned in the transcript of a discussion held by Japanese legal professionals with experience in Korea, in 1940. At that time no question was raised about the existence of an assassination plot, but the trial itself seems to have been regarded as something of a debacle. Yuhō Kyōkai, *Chōsen ni okeru shūhō seido kindaika no sokuseki* [Traces of the modernization of the judicial system in Korea] (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 110-13.

65. "The proceedings here, though nominally in an ordinary criminal court, are very different from those in Japan proper. For example, the judges do not wear robes as in Japan, but are dressed in a semi-military uniform, with buttons, braid, and epaulettes, and the general appearance of the court is more like a court martial than a civil court." *Japan Chronicle, The Korean Conspiracy Trial*, p. 158.

66. *Ibid., passim*. The speeches of the defense and prosecution are paraphrased in this work, which is the source of the information in the preceding paragraphs. See also McKenzie, *Korea's Fight for Freedom*, pp. 218-38.

67. Government-General of Chōsen, *Annual Report, 1912-1913*, pp. 56-57.

68. Of the two government-general publications during this time giving biographical data on the Korean nobility, neither mentions Yun Ung-nōl or his heir, Yun Ch'i-ho, although the last compendium of biographies in 1910 mentioned both (see n. 61). Chōsen Sotokulu, *Chosōn sinsa pogam* (in Korean) [Sketches of the Korean nobility] (Seoul, 1913) and *Mansōng Ilga* (a sort of *Who's Who* in Korea) (Seoul, 1913).

69. J. Earnest Fisher, "Yun: Statesman, Scholar," *Korea Times* (Seoul), August 27, 1972, p. 5. Dr. Fisher was a missionary in Korea for many years and was among Yun Ch'i-ho's American friends.

Interview with Yun Ch'i-ho's daughter, Mrs. Younghi Yun Whisnant, Bronx, New York December 23, 1972.

70. Government-General of Chōsen, *Annual Report, 1914-1915*, p. 48.

71. He was approached in 1919 by Sin Ik-hūi to help plan for the March First (*samil*) movement. He refused to participate: "I will follow, but only at a distance." Ch'oe Tu-ko, "Yun Ch'i-ho," in *Han'guk umul taegyē*, ed. Pak Sang-yōn, 10 vols (Seoul, 1972), 8:218. Yun was questioned by the Japanese authorities during the investigation of the *samil* movement but he was not held. Yi Pyōng-hōn, ed., *Sam'il undong pisa* [Secret history of the *samil* movement] (Seoul, 1959), pp. 752-53.

72. Yun Ki-sōn is one of Korea's most famous concert pianists today. Information on Yun's family from Younghi Yun Whisnant, and from Kim, *Yakchōn*, pp. 240-44.

73. Kim, *Yakchōn*, pp. 227-28. Lim "Songdo Higher Common School," pp. 106-12.

74. Rutt, *James Scarth Gale*, pp. 73, 382. The organization was called the Kidokkyo ch'ang-munsa.

75. Ch'oe In-ko, "Yun Ch'i-ho," p. 218.

76. For example, see Yun Ch'i-ho, "Hanmal oegyo pirok" [Secret diary of diplomacy in the fall of Korea], *Kaebvök sin'gan*, 1, no. 2 (1934):6-13. This article is mainly composed of passages in Chinese from Yun's diary describing the 1884 reform comp.

His translation of *Robert's Rules of Order* was published under the title of *Iihoe t'onayona kyuch'ik* (Seoul, 1939), 19 pp. Another purely utilitarian work was a Chinese character textbook entitled *Yuhak chach'wi* (Seoul, 1909).

His first-person account of how Methodist work started in Korea is "Thirty Years Ago," in *Southern Methodism*, ed. Ryang, pp. 98-100.

77. "Confucianism in Korea," article attributed to Yun Ch'i-ho in KR (1895):404.

78. James S. Gale, *Korea in Transition* (New York: Board of Foreign Missions, Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1909), p. 114.

79. T. H. Yun [Yun Ch'i-ho], "A Plea for Industrial Training," KMF 7, no. 7 (July, 1911):185-86.

80. T. H. Yun, "A Korean's Opinion on Female Education in Korea," KMF 14, no. 6 (June, 1918):124.

81. Yun Ch'i-ho, "Ruminations of an Old Man, II," memorandum dated October 15, 1945, p. 2.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

GLOSSARY

Asan	牙山
ch'amp'an	參判
Ch'önan	又安
Cho Pyong-sik	趙東式
Chungch'uwön ugwön	中樞院議官
chungin	中人
Chwaong	左翁

Yun Ch'i-ho

尹致昊

Dōjinsha

同人社

Haep'yōng

海平

Ilchinhoe

一進會

Itō Chiko

尹東致昊

kabo

甲午

Kaesōng

開城

Kidokkyo ch'angmunsa

基督教昌文社

kizoku (Korean: kwijok)

貴族

Kojong

高宗

kunsu

郡守

kyemong

啟蒙

Ma Nora

馬天人

Ma Pūn

馬天人

Muan

務安

Nakamura Masanao

中村正直

Nūngju

綾州

Paek Mae-yō

白梅麗

pobosang

隊負荷

pobusang

隊負荷

pyōlgigun

別技軍

Samhwa

二和

Sinch'on

新村

Sinminhoe

新民會

sinsa yuramdan

紳士遊覽團

Sōnch'ōn

宣川

Sunjong	純宗
Tachan chaganghoe	大韓日報
Tachan maeil sinbo	大韓每日新報
T'aep'yongyang yôn'guso	太平洋研究所
Uijongbu ch'amüa	議政府參議
unsu	運數
Wönsan	元山
Yun Chang-sön	尹長壽
Yun Ch'i-ho	尹致昊
Yun Ki-sön	尹琦喜
Yun Kwang-sön	尹光善
Yun Po-hüi	尹寶姬
Yun Ung-yöl	尹雄烈
Yun Yeng-hüi	尹龍姬
Yun Yóng-hüi	尹瑛姬
Yun Yóng-sön	尹永善

